Charles Lister is a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute. Joseph L. Votel is a distinguished senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and the former commander of U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Central Command.
By Charles Lister
and Joseph L. Votel
A U.S. departure from Iraq has long been demanded by political factions in Baghdad aligned with Iran, especially since regional tensions surged after Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7. While Iran’s political allies in Iraq have used their considerable influence within the government, Iran’s militant proxies have launched 222 attacks on U.S. forces to force the issue. They appear to have won their point.
The 2,500 troops currently in Iraq continue to support the ongoing campaign against the Islamic State. In fact, on Aug. 29, U.S. and Iraqi forces launched their largest joint operation in years, with more than 200 Special Operations troops hitting a network of bunkers in Anbar province, killing a wide swath of the group’s Iraqi leadership. The U.S. presence in Iraq is also integral to the U.S. deployment next door in Syria, where 900 American troops remain engaged in a vital campaign against the Islamic State alongside our local partners, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Without forces in Iraq, it is hard to envision troops remaining in Syria for long.
Herein lies a serious problem. While the Islamic State’s territorial “state” was defeated in early 2019, the group has persisted. Three years before we dealt it that final territorial defeat, Islamic State fighters took advantage of the chaos in Syria and undertook what it called at the time a “retreat to the desert.” Since then, the Islamic State has slowly but methodically rebuilt itself in Syria’s badiya, a vast expanse of desert that is only minimally controlled by Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
Signs of a gradual Islamic State recovery in Syria’s central desert were evident last year. Still, this year, that recovery has become a resurgence — spilling over into northeastern Syria, where U.S. forces are operating. So far this year, the jihadist group has conducted more than 500 attacks across Syria, almost tripling its operational tempo over 2023. For the first time in years, the Islamic State is launching roughly the same number of attacks in regime areas as in the U.S.- and SDF-administered areas of Syria. That is already ringing alarm bells, as U.S. Central Command suggested in a public statement in July.
Yet attack numbers tell us only half the story. The Islamic State has also grown in sophistication. Its attacks have grown in scale, with more significant numbers of fighters deployed to target bigger fixed targets. The terrorist group deployed at least four car bombs in attacks and plots in 2024, and IED attacks are surging, with one in June, four in July and 10 in August — five of which came in the last days of the month. Urban attacks and operations have become increasingly common. The Islamic State’s once notorious extortion network is also back in full force, with bespoke invoices issued to businesses across central and eastern Syria, and enforcers routinely attacking those who refuse to pay up.
The Islamic State’s resurgence in Syria is occurring within an ongoing civil conflict and spiraling humanitarian crisis that shows no sign of abating. Nearly 10,000 militants remain detained in two dozen makeshift prisons, some of which are highly vulnerable to attack. Two weeks ago, several foreign militants escaped. Fifty thousand women and children, primarily relatives of fighters and former residents of the group’s “state,” remain within the al-Hol and Roj camps, where living conditions are dire, and extremists continue to operate secretly.
For now, the Islamic State is prioritizing its recovery and resurgence in Syria. Next door in Iraq, the network is a shadow of its former self, having conducted just 40 or so attacks in 2024. But the trend lines are clear, and the group’s deepest roots and history remain on Iraqi soil. There is no question that as far as the Islamic State is concerned, expanding its Syrian surge into Iraq is part of its plan.
The announcement of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in two years’ time will boost the Islamic State’s confidence significantly. As troops begin to draw down, the terrorist group will unquestionably seek to step into the resulting vacuum. As reports from the Defense Department inspector general continue to highlight, U.S. forces remain integral to many essential functions of an effective Iraq-based effort against the Islamic State. The prospect of an increasingly advantageous operating environment in Iraq developing on the heels of a resurgence in Syria will be seen as almost too good to be true for extremists.
Given the state of the Islamic State today, ongoing regional hostilities and an upcoming U.S. election, a decision to announce a deal to bring the anti-Islamic State coalition to an end is bewildering. Yet, it does now seem inevitable.
Should that be the case, the United States and its allies must set the conditions for a successful conclusion — one that preserves our influence, protects our interests and does not add more instability to the region.
First among all priorities is maintaining a relationship with the Iraqi Security Forces, who rose to the challenge of liberating their country and dealing the Islamic State a severe blow. This would most likely take the form of a U.S. security cooperation element embedded within our diplomatic mission. This would be a platform to continue institutional support for the Iraqi forces without all the activities involved with supporting combat operations. (It is no coincidence that the Baghdad facility that would house such a deployment was just attacked by Iranian proxies.)
Second, we must devise a plan for how we will preserve access through Iraqi Kurdistan to continue to support our efforts in northeastern Syria. This would require more discussion with the Iraqi government, and while an agreement would be framed as more logistics-oriented than operationally focused, it should also incorporate a small Special Operations forces element dedicated to targeted counterterrorism operations in Iraq, when appropriate. The agreed December 2026 deadline for withdrawing from Irbil provides us time to negotiate such arrangements.
Finally, the United States and our allies must continue to work with regional partners, such as Jordan, to ensure ready forces, basing and access are available to address the likely reemergence of the Islamic State.
We have been on this path before. We have seen how terrorist groups reconstitute themselves if given the opportunity. Having regrettably decided to withdraw, we must now set the conditions for a successful transition — one that give us the best possible leverage against the rising threat from jihadist extremism.
